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Mixed Legal Systems... and the Myth of Pure Laws
Vernon Valentine Palmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps there is no consensus among comparatists as to the
meaning we should give to the expressions "mixed legal system"
or "mixed jurisdictions" (they are frequently used
interchangeably), but the issue is gaining sharper focus as a result
of contemporary debate and developments. This article is not an
attempt to offer a new or better classification scheme nor to offer a
new set of labels. Rather I only intend to discuss some of the
problems involved in the use of the terms we have been using. The
subject of classification remains significant if we are to understand
whether bijural systems like Louisiana, Scotland, Quebec, and
South Africa have common characteristics and can be studied
comparatively with profit or what can be gleaned from their
"mixed jurisdiction" experience. The way we classify systems
affects attitudes, perceptions, and sometimes reveals prejudice
about those systems. It may even affect the "value" that is placed
upon their experience. This article is a series of remarks and
reflections on the labels and the values we attach to the mixed
systems.
One problem with adopting a current conception of a "mixed
system" (wherein the sole requirement is only the presence or
interaction of two or more kinds of laws or legal traditions within
each system)' is that most of Africa, Asia, India, and the
"classical" mixed jurisdictions as well will answer to this
description. The category is extremely broad since it is as
extensive as the notion of legal pluralism. It of course lumps
together systems with very little in common, such as Louisiana and
Algeria, or Quebec and China.2  Indeed, rigorous use of this
conception, which is factual in its approach, would mean that the
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. See Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal
Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 477, 480-86
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
2. Jacques du Plessis has noted this breadth: "When legal pluralism is
defined broadly as the 'situation in which two or more laws interact' it
essentially absorbs the concept of the mixed system." Id. at 483 n. 17 (citation
omitted). One may go further: It absorbs nearly all the systems of the world.
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quasi-totality of the legal systems of the world might be regarded
as "mixed legal systems." It would imply that countries such as
England, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Switzerland,
which are generally thought of as though they were either pure
common law or civil law systems, would need to be reclassified,
for they are certainly mixed systems in a factual sense. Of course
no one expects that revolution to happen. Indeed if the choice is
between the indiscriminately lumped and the artificially pure, we
will probably continue with the artificially pure. But at that point
the practical, scientific, and didactic reasons for classifying
systems in the first place are significantly reduced.3
II. ANALYSIS
Having posed the problems in these terms, let me now make a
number of remarks and observations.
A. A Factual Approach to Mixed Systems
I seriously doubt that there should be much debate on the
question, "What constitutes a mixed legal system?" We may not
know the causes of legal mixtures, but we at least know what a
legal mixture is. We can verify its existence factually. If we apply
Hooker's definition that "legal pluralism refers to the situation in
which two or more laws interact, 'A then it follows that the presence
within a single legal system of laws, methods, techniques, or legal
institutions drawn from another tradition or foreign system is
sufficient to constitute a mixed legal system. On the other hand,
the absence of any laws, methods, or institutions drawn from a
different legal tradition would suggest that the system is "pure"
rather than mixed. A mixed system, then, would be one in which
3. An alternative approach might try to redraw the world map in terms of a
list of "traditions" rather than "systems," but this approach may have little
appeal as a classificatory tool. According to H. Patrick Glenn, the traditions are
antithetical to exclusivist categorizations and do not provide a basis to classify
legal systems. See H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and
Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, supra note 1, at 425 [hereinafter Glenn, Families & Traditions]; see also
H. Patrick Glenn, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 33-34 (2d ed. 2004).
Furthermore, since it is society's collective memory that is constitutive of a
tradition's identity, then all traditions would seem to be pure from the internal
point of view. Traditions may in fact contain mixtures, but this would not
necessarily be acknowledged as a fact, nor would it deal easily with mixed
systems that are astride two or more traditions.
4. M.B. Hooker, LEGAL PLURALISM-AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL
AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 6 (1975).
1206 [Vol. 67
2007] MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AND PURE LA WS
two or more legal traditions, or parts thereof, are operating
simultaneously within a single system. This factual test, as I have
already indicated, is clearly not orthodox among comparative
scholars who seem to employ normative and prescriptive criteria,
but for purposes of discussion I will adopt the factual test in order
to make a number of points clear.
B. Pervasiveness of Mixed Systems
The first implication stemming from the factual approach is
that we live in a predominantly mixed and plural world. Mixtures
are pervasive and they are center stage. There is no reason to
regard them as strange and anomalous. It should be acknowledged
that mixed systems outnumber "pure" systems of law. They
include some of the most populous areas on the globe, such as
China, India, and many countries in Africa. In a study by the
University of Ottawa, which classified legal systems using six
categories (civil law, common law, Muslim law, Talmudic law,
customary law, and mixed systems), 5 it was found that ninety-two
legal systems are mixed,6 ninety-six are "civil law," and forty-two
are "common law." From a factual point of view, however, the
number of mixed systems is necessarily far greater than the study
suggested. A number of mixed systems were listed as "civil law,"
while a number of "civil law" systems could have been listed as
mixed if the criteria for the latter had been applied consistently.7
Moreover, the list of civil law countries covers most of Europe, but
according to many observers the European Union itself is
becoming a mixed legal system and the Member States, including
the United Kingdom, are experiencing not merely the pangs of
convergence but are receiving direct doses of non-national law.
Upon reflection, all of the so-called civilian legal systems within
5. Nicola Mariani & Graciela Fuentes, LES SYSTtMES JURIDIQUES DANS LE
MONDE (2000). As will be seen, I have reservations about the methods used in
this study.
6. The criteria for this category were explained as follows:
The term "mixed," which we have arbitrarily chosen over other terms
such as "hybrid" or "composite," should not be construed restrictively,
as certain authors have done. Thus this category includes political
entities where two or more systems apply cumulatively or interactively,
but also entities where there is a juxtaposition of systems as a result of
more or less clearly defined fields of application.
Id. at 17 (Benjamin W. Janke trans., 2007).
7. See id. for the criteria. For example, the list of "mixed systems" omits
Benin and Central African Republic. They are listed among "civil law"
countries, in disregard of the fact that there are African customary law systems
operating in these countries alongside of civil law.
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the European Union could easily be regarded as mixed legal
systems. These systems have been for many centuries an amalgam
of indigenous and exogenous sources. Thus Reinhard Zimmermann
has commented:
All our national private laws in Europe today can be
described as mixed legal systems. None of them has
remained "pure" in its development since the Middle Ages.
They all constitute a mixture of many different elements:
Roman Law, indigenous customary law, canon law,
mercantile custom, and Natural Law theory, to name the
most important ones in the history of the law of
obligations.8
Professor Zimmermann's point, however, cannot be confined
to Europe. The world's legal systems may all be described as
diversified blends of various ingredients: they may include
chthonic laws, indigenous customs, exogenous customs, religious
laws (Jewish, Hindu, Islamic, or Canon), law merchant, natural
law, Roman civil law, common law, and various statutes and
codes. I believe it is not at all unusual or surprising to discover
five or six layers of exogenous elements in any single private law
system one cares to examine.
Thus the factual approach to classification is useful as a
contrast to the normative and prescriptive assumptions that
underlie our traditional way of classifying systems.
C. The Myth of Pure Laws
If these generalizations are accepted, then it may be asked why
comparatists constantly make it sound like there are such things as
"pure" systems of common law, civil law, or whatever kind. The
reason is not entirely clear. Eurocentrism may play a part, and
ingrained outlooks are difficult to change. 9 Whatever the reason,
however, we are certainly engaging in oversimplifications that
8. Reinhard Zimmermann, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW,
EUROPEAN LAW 159 (2001).
9. H. Patrick Glenn argues for example that the very notion of "legal
families" and "legal systems" is Eurocentric in character. In his words,
"Western legal traditions are the only ones of the world which have developed
the concept of a legal system, and the only ones of the world which purport to
describe law, notably in terms of legal families, as opposed to simply living
according to it." Glenn, Families & Traditions, supra note 3, at 435. Yet
research would establish that the notion of a "legal system" is one of the West's
great exports and has been received almost everywhere in the world. Since non-
Western countries make use of it, has it not shed its Eurocentric cast?
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conceal reality. First, without openly saying so, we are using
private law as the proxy for judging entire legal systems.
Obviously when we use signifiers like "common law" or "civil
law" or "Muslim law," these say little or nothing about the
constitutional, administrative, or criminal laws in such systems.'
0
It would be more accurate to call this a classification of private law
systems. Second, these private law signifiers do not even refer to
the whole of the private law system. Instead they simply make
resort to the oldest taproot of the system as the identifying feature.
The other roots are ignored. It is a technique of "limited feature
classification,"" which conveniently leaves out the non-indigenous
areas of private law (such as the law merchant, the canon law, and
so forth) that have created a legal alloy. Only by dint of this
reductionism can anyone claim that these systems are pure and not
mixed.
D. A Glance at England and the European Union
Digressing for a moment, it is increasingly argued that the
English common law is already a mixed system, and nowadays
English lawyers seem more inclined to acknowledge the
intermixture than in the past.' Hector MacQueen argues that
English law has been transformed in the past two centuries. He
cites the decline of the doctrine of consideration in contract, the
Continental origins of Hadley v. Baxendale, and recent legislation
that abolished the privity principle in order to bring English law
into line with other jurisdictions of the European Union. The field
of obligations, he continues, has been restructured as a system once
based upon the forms of action into one "founded on the division
of contract, tort, and unjust enrichment."' 3  David Ibbetson
similarly notes that "The Common law of obligations grew out of
the intermingling of native ideas and sophisticated Roman
10. I have argued elsewhere that a wider public law focus is essential to an
understanding of the mixed jurisdictions: "The common-law and civil-law
families are really 'private-law' families carved from private-law comparisons.
Normally this private-law focus is thrown into disarray when the public law is
included and compared." Vernon Valentine Palmer, Introduction to the Mixed
Jurisdictions, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY
6 n.8 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2001).
11. Glenn, Families & Traditions, supra note 3, at 438.
12. See, e.g., T.H. Bingham, "There is a World Elsewhere:" The Changing
Perspectives of English Law, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513 (1992).
13. Hector MacQueen, Looking Forward to a Mixed Future: A Response to
Professor Yiannopoulos, 78 TUL. L. REv. 411,412 (2003).
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learning."' 14 Entry into the European Union has of course hastened
a rapprochement with the Continent.' 5 English law has absorbed
close to twenty European Community ("EC") Directives affecting
the area of traditional private law and has been receiving a variety
of Continental ideas, including the principles of proportionality
and legitimate expectation, the distinction between private law and
public law, teleological and purposive reasoning, and Continental
drafting style. 
16
The European Union may soon be recognized as a
supranational mixed system. That seems to be an outcome that
some Europeanists desire,' 7 and there are various signs that this is
happening. There is noticeable convergence in the field of
contract, for example, as witnessed by the Vienna Convention on
the International Sale of Goods, the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, and the Principles of
European Contract Law. 18 The single civil code of private law, if
this European project ever materializes, would necessarily rely on
these models and would produce a mixed private law system based
upon common law and civil law elements. 
9
E. Mixed Systems as Models and Paradigms
Recognizing that hybridity is a universal fact will no doubt
require us to revise some of the received attitudes and prejudices
about mixed systems, particularly attitudes about "classical" mixed
14. D.J. Ibbetson, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 1 (1999).
15. In Lord Dennings's famous allusion, "[T]he Treaty is like an incoming
tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back." H.P.
Bulmer, Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A., [1974] Ch. 401, 418 (U.K.). For an appraisal
of the effects as of the 1990s, see B.S. Markesinis, THE GRADUAL
CONVERGENCE 30-32 (1994).
16. See Mark Attew, Teleological Interpretation and Land Law, 58 MOD. L.
REV. 696 (1995); Bingham, supra note 12, at 522-24; Jonathan E. Levitsky, The
Europeanization of the British Legal Style, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 347 (1994);
Diana Nestorovska, Influences of Roman Law and Civil Law on the Common
Law, 1 HANSE L. REV. 79 (2005).
17. See Hein Kbtz, The Value of Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TUL. L. REV. 435,
439 (2003) ("It may sound a bit premature and starry-eyed, but I will say it
nonetheless: let us hope that the gradual establishment of a European law as a
mixed jurisdiction will allow us to combine the best of both worlds.").
18. For example, a comprehensive concept of breach of contract has now
been achieved across Europe, though this required a break with a long tradition
to the contrary in certain civil law countries. See Jdrgen Basedow, Towards a
Universal Doctrine of Breach of Contract: The Impact of the CISG, 25 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 487 (2005).
19. See MacQueen, supra note 13, at 417.
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jurisdictions such as Louisiana, Scotland, South Africa, Quebec,
Puerto Rico, and so forth. For example, does it any longer serve a
useful purpose to speak of these systems as historical accidents,
2 0
or as marginal cases, or as "odd men out" in a binary civil
law/common law world? In my opinion, mixed systems have been
too much at the center of legal. evolution to be regarded as
something unusual or strange. They cannot be both paradigms and
pariahs at the same time. A useful classification scheme ought to
begin with their centrality as a point of departure. 21 That would
force us to abandon the conceit that "pure" legal systems are
somehow privileged or preferred, that some mixtures are superior
to other mixtures, or that the utility of mixed systems lies in the
incidental lessons or insights they may have for their parents. 22 It
is frequently remarked that the mixed jurisdictions like Scotland
and Louisiana are "laboratories of comparative law" and that
others may benefit from studying their experiences or their
practices. In reality, however, all systems are laboratories of
comparative law, and any system's experience could be of some
value for others.
Hector MacQueen has made the point (in words that can be
endorsed as an elevated approach to the study of plural systems
generally) that:
It is contrary to the spirit of mixed legal systems [to
analyze their past] on the basis that one part of the mix is
good and the other bad. Instead the mixed systems need to
be evaluated on their own terms-that is as neither civil
law nor common law-and analysts must accept that a
mixed past means a mixed future.2
20. Glenn compares them to anomalies in the world of science where
complex structures may represent "frozen accidents." H. Patrick Glenn,
Quebec: Mixitg and Monism, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND
MIXING 1, 14 (Esin Orficai et al. eds., 1996).
21. Esin Orfuci! shares this view that all legal systems are overlaps and
mixes to varying degrees and thus their mixed nature should be the starting point
of comparative classification. See Esin OrUcii, Family Trees for Legal Systems:
Towards a Contemporary Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 359, 363 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004).
22. For example, it has been asserted that Israeli drafting successes may
reassure England of the feasibility of changing its drafting style; that Scots law
or the McGregor code may serve as a template for the single European code; and
that Louisiana law may show how common law/civil law ideas can be
conciliated in a civil code. See Giuseppe Gandolfi, CONTRACT CODE DRAWN up
ON BEHALF OF THE ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION v-xi (1993); K6tz, supra note
17, at 438-39.
23. MacQueen, supra note 13, at 412.
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Thus if it were necessary to find some "value" in their makeup
or their nature it is surely not in the form of their incidental value
for others but rather in what they can reveal about the formation
and evolution of private law systems everywhere. Their value is
best understood in terms of why they were originally formed, why
they are recurrently preferred, and what they have done for the
peoples they have served.
F. An Ancient Pedigree
This brings me to an historical point. The mixed legal systems
have been with us since antiquity and have been continually
generated in conditions of increased social contact, commerce, and
communication between peoples. The incubation of these systems
within empires, for example, suggests that mixing is unavoidable
(and maintaining original purity unattainable) once there is
sufficient social and intellectual connection with foreign people.
In this section of my article I will turn briefly to discuss the Roman
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the colonial empires of the
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. These supranational enterprises
of the past suggest that the mixed systems of today are part of a
larger historical pattern.
G. The Roman Empire
Empire transformed the law of the Roman people into a mixed
system, and at the same time it created a series of such systems
within Rome's provinces. One reason for this development
appears to have been the sheer number of foreign tribes brought
together under Roman rule,24 and a second reason would be the
value the Romans attached to personal laws. From early antiquity
(third century A.D.) the Romans followed the view that the law
applicable to a person was determined not by the territory in which
he lived but by the national group from which he came.25 Partly
24. On the large number of foreigners flowing in and out of Rome, their
tribal networks and the cosmopolitan nature of its population, see Callie
Williamson, THE LAWS OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE: PUBLIC LAW IN THE EXPANSION
AND DECLINE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 240-43, 262-67, 270-71 (2005).
25. See Michael Lambris, THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ROMAN LAW 48
(1997); George Mousourakis, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
OF ROMAN LAW 418 (2003); Barry Nicholas, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN
LAW 57 (1969) ("Ancient law was in principle 'personal' . . . Roman law
applied to Roman citizens, Athenian law to Athenian citizens."). There may
have been instances in which a people were admitted to the Empire but did not
retain their tribal custom, perhaps because they had already been sufficiently
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out of pragmatism and partly out of respect, the Romans did not
impose their private law on others. The mosaic of a mixed system
was therefore already in the making in the form of the duality
between Roman rule and the personal law of different peoples
brought into proximity. Thus we find that peregrini at Rome were
not governed by Roman law. The law applied to them was their
own native or personal law, but since disputes could involve
various non-Romans with conflicting personal laws, the peregrine
praetor built up a composite legal system, the ius gentium, which
in turn exercised influence over the ius civile.26 Eventually parts of
this body of law applied not only to transactions involving
peregrines but to transactions between citizens. The ius gentium
was partly "received" by the urban praetor, while the ius civile
was in turn partly "received" by the peregrine praetor.27 The two
legal orders represented a mixed system in Rome.
The collapse of the Empire in the West (by 476 A.D.) reversed
the political position of Rome, but it did not arrest the interaction
between Roman law and other personal laws. The ascendant
German tribes continued living according to their own laws and
customs, while Romans in the population and the clergy continued
to be governed by Roman law. In many cases their German
overlords did not impose the personal law of the conqueror upon
their Roman subjects. Within a single kingdom there could be
pluralism of the personal laws and ease of interaction.28 Saint
Agobard, archbishop of Lyon from 816 A.D., pointed to the kind of
social relations this produced: "It constantly happens that of five
persons who are walking or sitting together, not one is subject to
the same laws as another."29  Thus some rulers ordered the
compilation of codes to reflect the Roman law, which their Roman
Romanized by living in close contact with the Roman society for several
generations. See P.S. Barnwell, Emperors, Jurists and Kings: Law and Custom
in the Late Roman and Early Medieval West, 168 PAST & PRESENT 6, 9-10
(2000).
26. See Simeon L. Guterman, THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PERSONALITY OF LAW
IN THE GERMANIC KINGDOMS OF WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE FIFTH TO THE
ELEVENTH CENTURY 39 (1990).
27. See Nicholas, supra note 25, at 58. One example cited by Nicholas was
that an old institution of the ius civile, the contract of stipulation, was made
applicable to peregrines. Id.
28. The Frankish capitulary of 768, for instance, stated: "All shall follow
their own law, both Romans and Salians; and those who come from other
regions shall live according to the law of their own country." Maurizio Lupoi,
THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER 394-95 (Adrian Belton trans.,
2000) (1994).
29. Mousourakis, supra note 25, at 419.
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subjects would follow. 30  The law applicable to the Romans in
Gaul was contained in the Lex Romana Visigothorum issued by
King Alaric II in 506 A.D. At first this was exclusively for Roman
subjects and did not apply to the entire population, but by 654 A.D.
it applied to Romans and Visigoths alike. 31  Likewise Roman
subjects in Burgundy were governed by the Lex Romana
Burgondionum pursuant to a policy under which the two peoples,
Burgundians and Romans, were deemed equal but distinct under
the law.32 On the Italian peninsula the Lombards permitted Roman
subjects to be governed by the law of Justinian.33 Thus
Mousourakis points out:
As in Italy, so in Gaul and Spain Roman law was
preserved, even though in a vulgarised form, through the
application of the principle of the personality of the laws,
but also through the medium of the church whose law was
imbued with the principles and detailed rules of Roman
law.
34
The laws, like the populations to which they applied, were
interactive and could not be hermetically separated. Directly or
indirectly the Roman law exercised influence over the Germanic
law and vice-versa. 35  As Roman and German elements in the
population fused progressively, Germanic customs tended to
become Romanized, while Roman laws tended to be barbarized.
"In this way," Mousourakis states, "the diversity of laws persisted
no longer as an intermixture of personal laws, but as a variety of
local customs." The customary law could thus become "a
combination of elements of Roman law and Germanic customary
law." 3
6
The point is that the Roman Empire in the West, as much in its
construction as in its disintegration, effectively generated mixed
systems of private law at an early date. These early Romano-
Germanic systems served as a means of preserving vulgarized
30. Seeid. at418.
31. See Lupoi, supra note 28, at 77-78.
32. See id at 82.
33. See Mousourakis, supra note 25, at 419.
34. Id. at 420. Lupoi says this alleged "principle" was not spelled out in any
source and did not exist as a principle. See Lupoi, supra note 28, at 388, 393.
35. According to Lupoi, "Visigothic legislation was invariably modeled on
Roman legal sources and the various sources of vulgar Roman law, which were
influenced by it in their turn." Lupoi, supra note 28, at 75. He notes, for
example, that King Euric was assisted in compiling his code by the Roman
jurist, Leon of Narbonne. See id. at 75 n.209.
36. Mousourakis, supra note 25, at 421.
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Roman law, and at the same time they were the legal groundwork
that made the later Bolognese revival possible. Of course the
mixed elements in these systems made it impossible to build any
sort of "pure" edifice with materials taken from their layered
foundation. The revival was a later chapter in the interaction
between Roman law and local laws and took place on the basis of
territoriality, but popular attachment to personal local laws would
continue the mixing process.
H. The Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire, founded in 1299, was from its inception
a plural legal system, which, according to Professor Orucui, would
evolve by the nineteenth century into a mixed system and would
finally emerge in the twentieth century as a civilian system.3 7 The
first Ottoman rulers, like the Romans, dealt with foreign peoples in
their midst on the basis of something similar to the principle of
personality. 38  Islamic law was the basic law applicable to
Moslems in the Empire, but non-Moslems were subject to their
own laws (criminal law excepted). Thus "the laws, faiths and
customs of other subject peoples were in fact respected and
allowed to continue to be practiced alongside Islamic Law."
39
Professor Oricu asserts, however, that up to the year 1839 this
system was not "mixed" because, while these different laws
existed side by side, there is no evidence of any interaction
between them. In her opinion the system turned into a mixed
system during a transitional period, 1839 through 1923, prior to the
massive reception of Western laws. "By the late 1880s the hybrid
character of the Ottoman legal system was well established. The
system itself was no longer solely Islamic but a mixed jurisdiction,
the Islamic and the civilian cultures operating side by side. At this
time it was plural, mixed, and in transition." It had "the
appearance of a 'salad bowl' with components from the civilian
37. See Esin Oricii, Turkey: Change Under Pressure, in STUDIES IN LEGAL
SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 89, supra note 20, at 89, 90-92.
38. Chibli Mallat sees a "powerful contrast" between "the overarching
system of Islamic law as a 'personal model' versus the dominant system of
Western law described as a 'territorial model."' Chibli Mallat, Comparative
Law and the Islamic Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 624.
39. Orficii, supra note 37, at 90. Thus Jews, Armenians, and Greeks living
in and near Istanbul followed their own laws and had separate courts. Non-
Moslems living on European lands also had their own courts and their own laws.
French residents, under the "Capitulations," had special status, extensive
privileges, their own Consular Courts, and their own laws.
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tradition, mostly French, the laws of the Christian minorities,
Islamic Law, and tradition all coexisting and intermingling. '40 In
the next period, 1923 to the present, she argues, Turkey became a
civil law state, "a full member of the civilian family of laws. ' A It
introduced a blend of foreign codes from Switzerland, Italy, and
Germany. In this process it could not of course achieve civil law
purity. Turkey became a mixed legal system because it was
composed of laws of different provenances. The systems from
which it borrowed were diverse and distinct strands of European
law, each with a heritage of non-indigenous elements.
. European Colonialism
Mixed systems and legal pluralism are closely associated with
European colonial rule. The empires of the Dutch, the British, the
French, the Germans, the Belgians, the Portuguese, and the Italians
projected European law into territories of Africa and Asia where
the indigenous peoples already had their own laws. Whether the
local laws would be suppressed entirely and replaced by that of the
metropole, or would they be retained to the extent it did not
interfere with political rule was a recurrent question. It is
remarkable, however, that each metropole generally recognized
and retained the personal statute of the indigenous peoples they
encountered, even though these emerging or emerged nation states
were general adherents of the principle of territoriality. Retention
of the personal law system was a technique of governance that was
justified on pragmatic grounds.42 Thus colonialism generally
produced a host of hyphenated legal systems. The British Empire
produced Anglo-customary law systems in Africa,43 hybrid Anglo-
Hindu law systems in India, Anglo-Buddhist law in Burma, and
Anglo-Muhammadan law in Pakistan.44 French colonial policy in
Africa, for example, made no attempt to suppress customary law
even though French policy was often thought to be based on
notions of assimilation and association with African peoples. As a
result, "the greater part of the received metropolitan law [of
France] remained inapplicable to the bulk of the population.,A5
Under the approach of both the English and the French, when a
population or religious law was encountered radically different
40. Id. at 92.
41. Id.
42. See Werner Menski, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 116
(2d ed. 2006).
43. See Hooker, supra note 4, at 58-62.
44. See id. at 86-101.
45. Id. at 220.
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from its own, the decision was taken to compartmentalize the
personal laws and apply them in a non-unitary plural way.
J The Rise of "Classical" Mixed Jurisdictions
The classical mixed jurisdictions, as stated earlier, are systems
in which the private law is essentially a structured blend of civil
law and common law. The majority of these systems were created
during the colonial era.46 They too reflect that the claims of the
personality principle never entirely vanished; the cultural acquis of
a personal law could prevail even in an era of emerging nation
states ostensibly committed to the "territorial" conception of law.47
Their raison d'6tre is not so dissimilar from the grounds that
inspired the earlier systems at Rome and Constantinople. Their
formation seems to entail a twofold process: on the one hand, an
assertion of personal law entitlement by the subjects; on the other
hand, a cost-benefit calculation by the colonial sovereign. The
issue must conciliate these two points of view:
At the genesis of the mixed jurisdictions are the claims of a
culture to preserve its own language, religion, historical
experience and, not least, its laws and customs. Hopes may
indeed be pinned upon the native legal system to serve as a
proxy for preserving the culture in all its manifestations.
On the other side is a political superior who considers the
costs and benefits of allowing such a result. These claims
therefore may have to be asserted openly and strenuously in
a test of political strength, or they may quietly gain
recognition because of statesmanship or negotiation.
From a review of five intercolonial transfers, it can be
suggested that demographics on the ground, language issues, local
remonstrances, cultural identifications, land holdings, military and
economic considerations, as well as questions of basic fairness
48were some of the factors influencing colonial authorities.
The decision in favor of retaining the existing civil law was
usually strongest in circumstances where there was a large,
46. Common-law/civil-law hybrids from the colonial period would include
Quebec, South Africa, Louisiana, Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, The Philippines,
Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Botswana, and
Cameroon. Exceptions arising for reasons unrelated to colonialism would
include Scotland, Israel, and possibly Cyprus.
47. By this is meant that within a country's boundaries, there is one legal
system that is by definition exclusive.
48. See Palmer, supra note 10, at 21-22.
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non-anglophonic population of continental European
extraction already ensconced upon the land and already in a
position of numerical superiority and socio-economic
dominance. If this original population, however, was
politically overshadowed by a large American or English
population, the preexisting civil law could be abrogated
entirely. The jurisdiction [in that case] could make a
complete and immediate somersault from civil law to
common law.
An instructive lesson we can learn from the mixed jurisdictions
of the colonial era is that the fact of conquest, cession, or purchase
of a territory has never automatically led to a decision to impose a
new law or to keep the preexisting law of the people. It places this
question on the table, nothing more. The variables affecting its
resolution are essentially the same variables that sovereigns and
subjects have weighed before in many cases at various times and
places, including the Roman and Ottoman Empires.
III. CONCLUSION
The process behind mixed systems is a living one and is
constantly taking place around us. We are forced to recognize this
when we approach the subject in a more factual way. A factual
approach forces us to consider them as the norm rather than the
exception, as the general pattern of legal development rather than
historical accidents. For example, the extent to which the private
law systems of the European Union are converging through the
directive process and the quest for uniform laws, and the extent to
which a single civil code will Europeanize the private laws of all
Member States are questions that will determine whether Europe is
or soon becomes a mixed system. As we watch these
developments, we should anticipate that personal attachment to
private law will be asserted in all its humanistic and cultural
dimensions and this claim will be weighed against the interests of a
more perfect union. The system that emerges will be following an
age-old blueprint for accommodating the claims of personal law in
a federated world.
1218 [Vol. 67
